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The Problem of Merit Transference
and the Kyōgyōshinshō
Hase sHōtō
It goes witHout saying that merit transference forms the basis of the Kyōgyōshinshō 教行信証 by Shinran 親鸞 (1173–1262), in particular the 
idea of two types of merit transference. And although various attempts have 
been made to interpret what exactly Shinran is referring to with these two 
concepts—especially the returning aspect of merit transference—it is still 
not entirely clear if any of these accurately portrays Shinran’s actual intent. 
As Terakawa Shunshō has stated: “While it may appear at first glance that 
Shinran’s concept of the two types of merit transference has already been 
thoroughly elucidated, I increasingly feel that research on this topic is insuffi-
cient and that proper research into this issue has yet to be done. . . . I eagerly 
await future research and discussions that deal with these issues seriously and 
straightforwardly from a broad perspective.”1 I believe that the possibilities 
and challenges for further research into the Kyōgyōshinshō lie herein.
In addressing this question, there are two possible research methods that 
may be adopted. One is to attempt to arrive at conclusions based on philo-
logical analysis of Shinran’s works. The other is to attempt to approach 
the essence of Shinran’s understanding by examining the various positions 
regarding the two types of merit transference that have already been pro-
posed by scholars and trying to get at the root of what they signify. Because 
my research focuses on how one should understand merit transference 
from the standpoint of philosophy and religious studies, I have necessarily 
adopted the latter approach. If one were to call the viewpoint of philological 
analysis—which focuses in closely on its subject matter—microscopic, then 
1 Terakawa 1993, p. 14.
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my viewpoint—which examines its subject from a distance—may be called 
macroscopic and therefore may be unable to avoid making sweeping gener-
alizations. But this viewpoint is not without certain advantages. By observ-
ing the object before us at a distance, we are able to get a clearer view of its 
outline and total form than would be possible if viewed up close.
Needless to say, the fundamental reason that there are so many differ-
ing views on Shinran’s two types of merit transference, and particularly 
on the returning aspect of it, is that this concept itself is a difficult one to 
grasp. Merit transference refers to the infinite Tathāgata changing its form 
to appear in the world of finite sentient beings in order to liberate those 
suffering beings and bring them to the infinite. In other words, merit trans-
ference is the outward expression of the infinite. However, that the infinite 
Tathāgata could appear and function within the finite world seems funda-
mentally impossible and therefore incomprehensible. This is the reason that 
the functioning of merit transference has been divided into a going aspect 
and a returning one, as well as the reason why various interpretations of 
these two types of merit transference have arisen.
However, one must admit that the more immediate reason that such a 
variety of views concerning Shinran’s understanding of the two types of 
merit transference exists lies in his works themselves. First, there is the 
imbalance in the Kyōgyōshinshō in the treatment of these two concepts, 
since the returning aspect is discussed only in a very small percentage of 
the work as a whole. Furthermore, there are two separate groups of stanzas 
within Shinran’s poetry that apparently show two different interpretations 
of the two types of merit transference, and it is unclear which of these 
interpretations represents his own understanding. This inconsistency, more 
than anything else, is the source of the difficulty in understanding Shinran’s 
position. The discussion surrounding his understanding of the two types of 
merit transference has focused on deciding which of these two alternatives 
accurately expresses his ideas regarding this issue. However, because Shin-
ran himself presents these two together, it is not appropriate for us to con-
sider just one of these interpretations as representative of his understanding 
of merit transference while ignoring the other altogether. Indeed, both posi-
tions need to be understood as a unified whole. How, then, can his interpre-
tation of the two types of merit transference be understood when his two 
different positions are considered together? Also, what becomes the central 
problem when we look at the matter in this way? It is these issues that I will 
focus on in this paper as I attempt to approach Shinran’s understanding of 
the two types of merit transference.
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As for the methodology followed in this study, I will address three under-
standings—the two differing views found in Shinran’s poems in addition to 
one that synthesizes them both—in terms of their typology and clarify the 
fundamental point that they are each trying to express. Then, to elaborate, I 
will explore the problems that arise in our considerations by looking at anal-
ogous issues that were the subject of discussion in Protestant theology in the 
twentieth century. I will adopt this approach because I believe that the prob-
lem of Shinran’s two types of merit transference has a depth and breadth 
which should be discussed in a way that transcends these limited categories. 
By considering the question from a different perspective, the fundamental 
issue at stake will become more evident than when seen only from the posi-
tion of the two types of merit transference.
What, then, are the three ways of understanding the two types of merit 
transference?
The first understanding interprets the two types of merit transference as 
“entering into the returning aspect from the going aspect.” This interpreta-
tion can be seen within some of Shinran’s poems: “In the vast, unimaginable 
gratuity of the merit transference of Namu Amida Butsu 南無阿弥陀仏, as one 
of the benefits of the going aspect of merit transference, the returning aspect 
is entered,”2 and also, “From the great love of the going aspect of merit 
transference, the great compassion of the returning aspect is attained. What 
would the bodhisattvas of the Pure Land do without the merit transference of 
the Tathāgatha?”3 In this interpretation, the going aspect is understood to be 
the aspect of sentient beings who, having attained faith, are born in the Pure 
Land and reach the point where they will eventually realize nirvana, while 
the returning aspect is understood as that of sentient beings who, having 
realized nirvana, return to this world to benefit others. This first understand-
ing, although plagued with a variety of distortions and misinterpretations, 
has become the traditional understanding of the two types of merit transfer-
ence.
Here, the interpretation of the two types of merit transference as “having 
been born in the Pure Land and then returning to this defiled world” follows 
the expression of Tanluan 曇鸞 (476–542?); but Shinran, by reassigning 
grammatical markers used to read Tanluan’s passage, shows that the agent 
that transfers merit is not a sentient being, but the Tathāgata. Therefore, 
the phrase “going to that land and returning to the defiled world” ceases to 
2 Shinran Shōnin Zenshū Kankōkai 1969, vol. 2, p. 183. Also, T 83: 666b22–24.
3 Shinran Shōnin Zenshū Kankōkai 1969, vol. 2, p. 184. Also, T 83: 666b25–27.
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have a literal meaning and takes on a symbolic one wherein sentient beings, 
through faith, are taken up and carried by the working of the Tathāgata that 
goes back and forth between this defiled land and the Pure Land. However, 
because this first understanding remains burdened with several distortions 
that arise from not correctly grasping the meaning of Shinran’s reinterpreta-
tion of Tanluan’s position, it has become difficult to ascertain just what its 
fundamental significance is.
The essence of what this first understanding signifies lies in its attention 
to the immanent aspect of the working of the Tathāgata, that is, that the 
power of the Tathāgata’s original vow permeates the very life of sentient 
beings and works through faith—that the infinite works having become the 
finite. 
This first understanding was expressed straightforwardly by Suzuki 
Daisetsu 鈴木大拙 (1870–1966), who stated: “The Pure Land is a place 
where it is useless to stay. Those who have gone to the Pure Land must 
bring the Pure Land right back to this world and do the work of benefit-
ing sentient beings.”4 Since sentient beings are taken up by the working of 
the Tathāgata within faith, the returning aspect of merit transference must 
also occur within that faith at the same time as the going aspect. Just as it 
is promised in the original vow that when sentient beings attain faith and 
live in the stage of the perfectly settled, they will definitely realize nirvana, 
that vow also promises that, together with the deepening of faith, the work-
ing of the Tathāgata acts through the bodies of those sentient beings in the 
form of the virtues of Samantabhadra. Therefore, the benefit described in 
the phrase “as one of the benefits of the going aspect of merit transference, 
the returning aspect is entered” necessarily begins working within the pres-
ent faith, although its completion is left to the future. What makes up the 
heart of this first understanding is the insight that the transcendental power 
of the Tathāgata appears within the basis of the lives of sentient beings and, 
with the deepening of faith, ultimately works as the motivating force within 
those beings. I believe that the phrase “die in faith and live in the vow” by 
Soga Ryōjin 曽我量深 (1875–1971) is an expression of this insight.
In a slightly different way, Tanabe Hajime 田邊元 (1885–1962) interprets 
“entering into the returning aspect from the going aspect” as the way in 
which the working of the Tathāgata is transmitted through the interaction 
of individuals within the historical world. That is, the enlightenment of 
Śākyamuni (the going aspect) becomes the returning aspect for other peo-
4 See Suzuki 1968–71, vol. 6, p. 45.
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ple, for example serving as the returning aspect that led the going aspect of 
Shandao 善導 (613–681), which in turn served as the returning aspect that 
led the going aspect of Hōnen 法然 (1133–1212), which again became the 
returning aspect that made Shinran’s going aspect possible. Tanabe holds 
that the two types of merit transference refer to the way in which, through 
these alternating shifts between the going and returning aspects, the working 
of the Tathāgata spreads within the historical world.
Although this interpretation seems to parallel the first type of under-
standing of the two types of merit transference in that it posits a shift from 
Śākyamuni’s going aspect to his returning one—because it holds that his 
returning aspect becomes the foundation for Shinran’s (and our) attainment 
of the faith of the going aspect of merit transference—it also resembles the 
second understanding. Thus, it is in an intermediate position between the 
two.
The second way of understanding the two types of merit transference 
holds that they are both the working of the Tathāgata which causes sentient 
beings to “attain the faith of the going aspect of merit transference.” This 
interpretation is expressed in Shinran’s poem, “When the merit transfer-
ence of Amida is fulfilled, there are two, the going aspect and the return-
ing aspect. Through these merit transferences alone is the faith made to be 
attained,”5 as well as his statement in the Sangyō ōjō monrui 三経往生文類 
(Collection of Passages on the Births [Described] in the Three Sutras) that 
“Because the person who attains true entrusting through the two types of 
merit transference of the Tathāgata assuredly attains the stage of the rightly 
settled, it is called Other Power.”6 
Here, the concrete expression of the going aspect is interpreted to be the 
inviting call of Amida Tathāgata, while the returning aspect is seen in the 
teachings and exhortations of our teachers, that is, in Śākyamuni, Hōnen, or 
Shinran, as well as in the Pure Land patriarchs and the various other guides 
and teachers who surround one. To use more technical doctrinal language, 
the returning aspect is seen in one’s debt of gratitude to all the myriad bud-
dhas and bodhisattvas, which take the specific form of one’s teachers. In 
this case, the two types together are the source or foundation that bring 
about the development of sentient beings’ “faith.”
Further, since the two types of merit transference are interpreted as the 
foundation for the attainment of faith, they are understood in relation to 
5 Shinran Shōnin Zenshū Kankōkai 1969, vol. 2, p. 93. Also, T 83: 661b16–18.
6 Shinran Shōnin Zenshū Kankōkai 1969, vol. 3, p. 28. Also, T 83: 675c29–676a2.
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Shandao’s parable of the two rivers and the white path, which discusses the 
process of the attainment of faith. That is, the going aspect of merit trans-
ference is understood as Amida, the savior who beckons from the western 
bank, while the returning aspect is understood as Śākyamuni, the teacher 
who encourages one from the eastern bank. In this way, the two types of 
merit transference are held to be the complete expression, the root and 
branch, of the teachings of the two honorable ones.
This second understanding, which can also be seen as a traditional one, 
is unique in that it takes the working of the Tathāgata to be the foundation 
of faith, and sees that working to exist outside of faith, in the name of the 
teaching. In this view, it is the transcendent aspect of the working of the 
Tathāgata which is emphasized. Specifically, the returning aspect is inter-
preted as “teaching.” Refusing to accept the first understanding, Terakawa 
has argued that this second understanding is the correct interpretation of 
Shinran’s view of the two types of merit transference. 
Soga, in his middling years, expressed the view that the returning aspect 
should be interpreted from the standpoint of “teaching” instead of “real-
ization,” which can be called a Copernican revolution, in itself. However, 
Terakawa, inspired by Soga’s teaching, interpreted the returning aspect as 
“teaching,” and, in doing so, discovered a balanced way to interpret the two 
types of merit transference within the arrangement of the Kyōgyōshinshō 
(which lays out teaching, practice, faith, and realization focused around the 
attainment of the faith of the going aspect of merit transference). Further, 
Terakawa clearly expressed his stance as interpreting the two types of merit 
transference within the framework of teaching, practice, faith, and realiza-
tion instead of interpreting them as aspects of the lives of sentient beings 
(that is, the aspect of sentient beings going to and returning from the Pure 
Land).
Terakawa states:
Regarding the two types of merit transference, which Shinran 
interpreted uniquely and laid out as the framework of Shin Bud-
dhism, they should always be understood in their relation to 
teaching, practice, faith, and realization as being one with these 
four. Discussing the two types of merit transference apart from 
teaching, practice, faith, and realization, or, as I often see, con-
sidering the two types of merit transference only in terms of the 
two types of merit transference, or, even worse, making argu-
ments and claims that discuss only the going aspect and the com-
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ing aspect, what can only be called “theories of two aspects”—I 
cannot help but think that all of these are not the correct under-
standing of Shinran’s interpretation of the two types of merit 
transference.7
Terakawa’s position, which holds that the two types of merit transference 
should be seen in “teaching, practice, faith, and realization,” and not in the 
“aspect of the lives of sentient beings,” is an articulation of the anatomy of 
the Kyōgyōshinshō based on an accurate reading of the text and deserves 
our careful attention.
However, the reverse side of this position, which sees the two types as 
having nothing to do with the aspect of the lives of sentient beings, seems 
to contain a problem that requires further consideration. Focusing on the 
transcendent aspect of the working of the Tathāgatha’s merit transference 
causes us to not give proper attention to its immanent aspect—that the 
Tathāgata works by appearing in the most profound, invisible depths of the 
lives of sentient beings. This is the dividing line between the first and sec-
ond understanding, which is a problem that revolves around the issue of the 
immanent nature and transcendent nature of the working of merit transfer-
ence. This is the fundamental problem of theology and doctrinal studies, of 
philosophy of religion and religious studies that arises when the relation-
ship between God and human beings or between the Tathāgata and sentient 
beings is called into question.
Actually, this is the problem that dominated the debate in twentieth-
century Protestant theology. Therefore, in order to clarify the points at 
issue in the problem of the two types of merit transference, I would like to 
consider the way in which the problem was treated within this debate. 
The history of twentieth-century Protestant theology was characterized by 
active debate started by the shock created by Der Römerbrief (The Epistle 
to the Romans) by Karl Barth (1886–1968) and the various criticisms and 
rebuttals to it. The focal point of this debate was his assertion of the abso-
lute autonomy of the word of God from things human and natural. Liberal 
theology in the nineteenth to early twentieth century, based on the thought 
of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), Ernst 
Troeltsch (1865–1923), and others, held that one attained cognizance of 
God through fundamental human emotions such as awe at the vastness of 
the universe and a sense of reverence and attempted to prove God’s exis-
tence unequivocally in the same manner. However, Barth, arguing that that 
7 Terakawa 1993, p. 83.
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position would “dissolve theology into the humanities,” sharply criticized 
it as ultimately being of the same cloth as the atheism of Ludwig Feuer-
bach (1804–1872). Barth argued for the independence of theology from 
the humanities. Further, he strongly advocated the principle position of the 
Bible, arguing that the word of God is the word of transcendent revelation 
to human beings which should not be read through things human or natural, 
but only based on the words of the Bible itself. In this way, by stressing 
the transcendent nature of the word of God, Barth was able to save theol-
ogy from the danger of being dissolved into the humanities, metaphysics, 
religious studies, as well as into the theories of the socialist movement.8 On 
this point Barth is correct, and his contribution to Protestant theology lies 
therein.
In this respect, Terakawa’s position, which holds that the working of the 
Tathāgata’s merit transference must not be understood in terms of the aspect 
of the life of sentient beings but only in relation to teaching, practice, faith, 
and realization—which transcend human beings—is essentially similar 
to Barth’s. Through this position, Terakawa was able to avoid the danger 
of incorporating the returning aspect of merit transference as the theoreti-
cal basis for a social movement that has no relation to religion. There are 
attempts both within and outside of the Shin community to emphasize the 
social nature of Shin faith and incorporate Shinran’s thought regarding 
the returning aspect of merit transference into social activism, and such 
attempts can only be avoided by arguing that the returning aspect should 
not be viewed as an “aspect of the lives of sentient beings.”
However, one must not overlook the problems in Barth’s position. By 
emphasizing the absolute and transcendent nature of the working of God 
toward human beings and completely excluding any point of contact 
between the two other than faith alone, this position ultimately makes the 
life of human beings an empty one without depth and hardens faith itself 
into dogma. Only when the working of God or the Tathāgata can be felt and 
maintained within the imperceptible depths of the human mind does human 
life take on depth and become creative. When one only emphasizes the tran-
scendent nature of God and places the life of sentient beings outside that 
transcendence, their lives and culture lose their depth and become empty, 
without meaning. The criticism of Barth’s transcendentalism (supernatural-
ism) by Paul Tillich (1886–1965) centers around this problem. 
8 Barth did not deny movements for social reform, but instead advocated them. However, 
he rejected any attempt to bring the name of God into such movements as confusing that 
which is human with that which is divine.
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Barth’s theology is said to be “dialectical theology.” However, Tillich 
states that the problem with this theology is that it is not dialectical. Dialec-
tics refers to the intermingling of negation and affirmation—the transcen-
dental, the infinite, negates itself to be internalized within the finite and the 
finite negates itself, opening up to the transcendental, the infinite. Tillich 
argued that the weakness in Barth’s thought is that it only emphasizes the 
aspect in which the infinite transcends the finite. In that sense, he says that 
it is not dialectical but supernatural.
Applying this argument to the issue of the two types of merit trans-
ference, emphasizing the transcendental nature of the working of the 
Tathāgata’s merit transference and keeping it outside the lives of sentient 
beings takes faith out of the realm of sympathy and places it into that of 
dogma. The infinite richness of the thought regarding the returning aspect 
of merit transference lies within experiencing the transcendent functioning 
of the Tathāgata as it works within faith, being reflected in the profundity 
of human life. When the returning aspect is limited to the debt of gratitude 
toward one’s teachers and kept outside of oneself, there is a danger that faith 
will become self-contained and dogmatically circumscribed. The working 
of the Tathāgata that is transcendent outside the self must also be under-
stood as something that transcends the self within. In order to transcend this 
difficulty with the second understanding, which limits the returning aspect 
to “teaching,” it is thus necessary to discover a third interpretation.
The third understanding is to consider the two types of merit transfer-
ence not only in the establishment of faith, but also as intermingled con-
sciousness of call and response between sentient beings and the Tathāgata 
in its working through emergence within the depths of the lives of sentient 
beings. Here the returning aspect of merit transference is not only seen as 
“teaching” which serves as the foundation of faith, but also as “realization” 
which appears within the depths of the lives of sentient beings along with 
the deepening of faith. The returning aspect is seen then in the reflection 
of the advent of the working of the Tathāgata in the historical world and its 
working within that world.
It was Soga who argued for this understanding. In the middle period of his 
life, Soga developed the unheard of idea that the returning aspect of merit 
transference should be seen in the teachings of one’s predecessors, and that 
it should be understood from the perspective of “teaching” instead of “real-
ization.” As I stated above, Terakawa was inspired by this idea of Soga’s 
and argued for the second understanding of the two types of merit transfer-
ence which is similar to Barth’s position. However, Soga later rejected this 
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sort of understanding and moved on to a third understanding which includes 
the first understanding discussed above within the second understanding, 
arguing that Shinran likely developed new ideas regarding the two types 
of merit transference during the last years of his life. That is, he came to 
understand the two types of merit transference not just from the perspec-
tive of the attainment of the entrusting mind, but also as a worldview that 
opens up within oneself together with the deepening of that entrusting. This 
is what Soga expressed in the words “die in faith and live in the vow.” The 
appearance of the working of the Tathāgata within the depths of the world of 
sentient beings comes to be understood in terms of “the intermingling con-
sciousness of call and response between the Tathāgata and sentient beings” 
(kannō dōkō 感応道交). In this way, the returning aspect of merit transference 
comes to be seen in the working of the Tathāgata as it is reflected in the his-
torical world through the activities of sentient beings. What is quite interest-
ing is that while Terakawa’s position is very similar to Barth’s, this position 
of Soga’s includes elements of Tillich’s criticism of Barth.
On this point, Soga stated that if the going aspect of merit transference 
is the ultimate truth, then the returning aspect is the secular truth, and that 
one can consider culture in general to be the returning aspect. The returning 
aspect may be seen where the formless Tathāgata is reflected in the human 
world, whatever form it may take. Further, by taking that in as a source of 
sustenance, human beings are able to live in this actual world. Their world 
comes to be seen not as dissociated from the Tathāgata, but as being laid 
over the world of the Tathāgata. The second understanding of the returning 
aspect of merit transference, which interprets it in terms of the “parable of 
the two rivers and the white path,” is not utterly dissolved, but the “orna-
ments of the Pure Land” come to the fore and this understanding is taken up 
within it. I believe that this is the reason that Shinran speaks of the “return-
ing aspect of merit transference” as the “ornaments of the Pure Land” in the 
chapter on realization in the Kyōgyōshinshō.
In this way, regarding the integration of the first understanding with the 
second one, the fundamental problem of the two types of merit transference 
comes to light. That problem was also posed in Protestant theology in the 
twentieth century and is full of potential for future consideration. I believe 
that the challenges and potential for research into the Kyōgyōshinshō lie in 
conducting research into the text from a broad perspective and giving care-
ful attention to the depth and breadth of the issues involved in this problem.
(Translated by Michael Conway)
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